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Abstract:  
Research aims: The study examined the effect of ownership structures on audit 
fees of listed firms in Ghana. The study used four indicators to measure 
ownership structure: managerial ownership, foreign ownership, government 
ownership, and substantial (block) ownership. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study sampled 21 listed non-financial firms 
over ten years, covering the period 2010 to 2019. The study also relied on 
secondary data extracted from the financial statement of these listed firms. Data 
were analyzed using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and panel 
regression analysis. 
Research findings: The study results showed a positive and significant association 
between foreign ownership and audit fees in Ghana. The study further found a 
positive and significant relationship between block ownership and audit fees. The 
results, however, uncovered an insignificant association between government 
ownership and audit fees. Furthermore, the study reported a positive coefficient 
between block ownership and audit fees, and the relationship was statistically 
significant. 
Theoretical contribution/Originality: The study is among very few studies that 
have examined ownership structures such as foreign ownership, managerial 
ownership, government ownership, and block ownership on audit fees in a 
developing country context and Ghana. 
Practitioner/Policy implication: This study found that the higher agency conflict 
through ownership structures will give rise to the higher audit fees paid to 
external auditors, which managers and auditors should consider in future 
assignments. 
Research limitation/implication: The study is limited by geographical area 
(Ghana), and as such future studies can conduct cross-country analysis of 
ownership structures on audit fees. 
Keywords: Foreign Ownership; Managerial Ownership; Government Ownership; 
Block Ownership; Audit Fees; Ghana 
Introduction 
External auditors are an essential piece of the corporate governance 
puzzle as they are responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the 
interest of investors (Coffie & Bedi, 2019; Desender, Aguilera, Crespi-
Cladera, & Garcia-Cestona, 2009). Auditors help ensure that contractual 
commitment is agreed to, thereby improving investor confidence through 
quality audits (Al-Okaily, 2010).  
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Several studies have examined determinants of audit fees after the seminal work on the 
subject matter by Simunic (1980).  
 
The numerous works on the subject matter emphasize their importance to the business 
world and academia. The audit fee is seen as agency cost, and its determination has a 
significant influence on other aspects of the company’s governance (Coffie & Bedi, 2019; 
Shan, Troshani, & Tarca, 2019). The importance of audit fees has prompted standard 
setters and regulatory bodies to demand its disclosure in financial statements (Musah, 
Anokye, & Gakpetor, 2018; Kikhia, 2014; Hentati & Jilani, 2013). Even though 
determinants of audit fees are not a new area of study, the influence of ownership 
structure on audit fees is relatively new (Nelson & Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015; Al-Okaily, 
2020; Shan et al., 2019). The collapse of larger organizations with accounting scandals as 
the underlying cause has affected the accounting profession's reputation and, more 
significantly, financial reporting (Barroso, Ben Ali, & Lesage, 2016; Griffin, Lont, & Sun, 
2009). The key lesson from these scandals globally and recently the banking scandal in 
Ghana attest that corporations must take corporate governance more seriously than 
ever to strengthen financial reporting quality and audit quality (Nelson & Mohamed-
Rusdi, 2015). Previous studies agree that ineffective corporate governance mechanism is 
one of the major causes of the numerous accounting scandals worldwide (Nelson & 
Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015; Mustapha & Che Ahmad, 2011; Aswadi Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain, 
& James 2011). Auditors have been suggested as one of the mechanisms for an 
organization to help reduce corporate scandals and improve the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
Studies have also shown that there is some connection between interference of 
corporate governance on auditor remuneration in the form of audit fees (Desender et 
al., 2009; Abdullah, Ismail, & Jamaluddin, 2008; Mitra, Hossain, & Deis, 2007). 
Ownership structure has been cited as one of the major interferences in effective 
corporate governance mechanisms (Shans et al., 2019; Liang, Qi, Xin, & Zhan, 2020; 
Choi, Kwak, & Yoo, 2007). It will definitely have a direct impact on audit risk, which can 
subsequently affect audit fees. It is because research shows that ownership structures 
affect the degree and extent of corporate governance as some investors will follow a 
company’s activities very keenly than others (Zureigat, 2011). For instance, institutional 
investors believe in having greater interest usually and following up on how the firm is 
managed than individual investors (Nawaiseh, Bader, & Nawaiseh, 2018). It suggests 
that firms with more institutional investors are likely to have closer monitoring from 
these institutional investors, which can have implications on audit fees.  
 
Even though a few studies have examined corporate governance characteristics and 
ownership structures as potential determinants of audit fees, Nelson and Mohamed-
Rusdi (2015) argue that institutional differences exist, especially in developing capital 
markets like Ghana. These differences include a weak market for corporate control, 
highly concentrated stock ownership, and high government ownership. The unique 
ownership structures in Ghana are possible evidence for differences in control and 
financial reporting processes and practices (Bopkin, 2011; Darko, Aribi, & Uzonwanne, 
2016; Owusu & Weir, 2018). Owusu and Weir (2018) argue that many corporations in 
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Africa have similar ownership structures dominated by high ownership concentration, 
high control, and high state ownership, which presents a unique environment for the 
study of its effect on audit fees. It means that the findings from the Ghanaian 
environment will be applicable in other African countries with similar ownership 
structures. The unique ownership structures of listed firms in Ghana provide an 
opportunity to examine their influence on audit fees. Besides, the evidence will also 
serve as a new empirical dimension in audit fees literature that can be tested in other 
contexts with different ownership structures.  
 
The fees auditors charge varies from firm to firm depending on the control environment 
of the clients and other factors. Previous studies on the effect of ownership structures 
and audit fees have mainly focused on developed and emerging markets, with none in 
the Ghanaian context. Evidence from prior studies suggests that audit fees paid to 
external auditors are affected by ownership structures of the clients (Nelson & 
Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015; Mitra et al. 2007; Niemi, 2005; Khan, Hossain, & Siddiqui, 2011; 
Adelopo, Jallow, & Scott, 2012; Shan et al. 2019; Liang et al. 2020). The reason for this 
conclusion is that different ownership structures give rise to different control 
mechanisms used by shareholders to monitor the day-to-day activities of the 
organization and financial reporting practices. It has also been established that the 
control environment, which is primarily influenced by ownership structures, also 
influences audit fees. Even though some studies have been done on the above subject in 
other jurisdictions, ownership structure varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which 
might have a different impact on audit fees. Most of these studies have been conducted 
in the United States, Europe, and Malaysia, where ownership structures are mostly 
diffused against a more concentrated ownership structure in Ghana. Besides, foreign 
ownership is one variable that has not been explored in literature as one of the 
ownership structures that influence audit fees. Most of the studies conducted in 
developed markets found a negative association between ownership structure and audit 
fees since audits play a critical role in reducing agency problems (Nikkinen & Sahlstöm, 
2004; Gul & Tsui, 2001; Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006; Fan & Wong, 2005). However, 
Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) study in Malaysia found a positive association 
between ownership structure and audit fees. The absence of previous studies linking 
ownership structures and audit fees in Ghana and the inconclusive evidence from 
previous studies in developed and emerging markets make this study very timely and 
useful. The study, therefore, seeks to examine the influence of various corporate 
ownership structures on audit fees in Ghana.  
 
The study makes a significant contribution to literature and policy in several ways. First, 
it is the first study that seeks to examine the influence of ownership structure on audit 
fees in Ghana to the best of our knowledge. Second, the study includes both foreign 
ownership and government ownership, which have received little attention in 
developed country studies concerning determinants of audit fees. The study also 
expands previous studies on determinants of audit fees in Ghana from corporate 
characteristics and corporate governance variables to include ownership structures. The 
study results are useful to regulators and policymakers as it reveals which ownership 
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structures enhance monitoring and control, which can be the basis for improving 
corporate governance mechanism through appropriate ownership regulations.  
 
Besides, some prior studies concern about the relationship between corporate 
ownership structure and audit fees, such as Niemi (2005), Mitra et al. (2007), Khan et al. 
(2011), and Adelopo et al. (2012), utilized outdated data before 2006. Therefore, this 
study utilizes the latest available data (2019) of listed companies in Ghana to investigate 
any new development that might have occurred in audit fees.  
 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Corporate Ownership Structures and External Audit Fees 
 
Yatim, Kent, and Clarkson (2006) assert that ownership structure provides a better 
ground for the study of audit fees’ determinants compared to corporate governance 
structures. On this same point, Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi (2015) argue that a 
company’s ownership structure determines its level of monitoring, which also affects its 
risk environment. According to Desender et al. (2009), from the production point of 
view of audit fees, audit fees charged by external auditors can be a function of 
ownership structure, especially where the perceived risk of the audit is higher in one 
ownership structure than the other. Within the context of ownership structure, three 
variations emerge stock as against mutual companies, public as against private 
companies, and a dominant shareholder. According to Villalonga and Amit (2006), it can 
be argued that the presence of a large shareholder could result in higher agency cost or 
higher control which can affect audit fees. Research has shown that dispersed 
shareholders are more likely to rely on external audits to monitor management behavior 
in addition to other mechanisms (Liang et al. 2020). It means that monitoring becomes 
more expensive when shareholding is dispersed, affecting audit fees. In the context of 
block ownership or concentrated ownership structures, there is a greater incentive for 
these shareholders to monitor management behavior because of their investment’s 
quantum, thereby reducing the role of external auditing.  
 
Some studies have examined how ownership structure influences audit fees in different 
contexts, especially in developed economies but with conflicting results. For instance, 
O’Sullivan’s (2000) study of United Kingdom firms revealed a negative association 
between executive directors' proportion of equity shares and audit fees. However, 
block/institutional ownership had no significant impact on audit fees. Mitra et al. (2007) 
study on United States firms disclosed a positive association between diffused 
institutional ownership and audit fees. However, their study found a negative and 
significant association between block ownership and audit fees. Finally, their study also 
reported a negative association between managerial ownership and audit fees. In their 
study of Bangladesh firms, Khan et al. (2011) found a negative association between 
institutional ownership and audit fees. Their findings support the agency cost theory, 
showing that companies with a concentrated ownership structure would have lower 
demand for audit quality, resulting in lower audit fees. Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi 
Musah, Okyere, & Boakye 
The Effect of Ownership Structures on Audit Fees of Listed Firms in Ghana 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, 2021 | 396 
(2015) examined the influence of ownership structure on audit fees using a sample of 
listed firms in Malaysia. The study uncovered a positive and significant association 
between audit fees and companies with more extensive foreign ownership and 
government-owned firms. The study, however, found no significant association between 
managerial ownership and audit fees. Hence, literature review shows that there is 
currently no study that examine the influence of ownership structures on audit fees in 
the Ghanaian context. A significant part of the literature on the above subject matter 
has focused on Europe, America, Malaysia, and other emerging economies. Little is 
known about how ownership structure influences audit fees in the African and Ghanaian 
context.  
 
Theoretical Review based on Agency Theory 
 
The agency theory has been the most dominant in audit research (Nelson & Mohamed-
Rusdi, 2015). Most of these studies see audit as a consequence of agency problems, and 
as such, they use audit fees as a proxy for agency costs (Mustapha & Che Ahnad, 2011; 
Nelson & Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015). Others have also employed audit fees as a proxy for 
audit quality and agency conflicts (Salleh, Stewart, & Manson, 2006; Dey, 2008). Other 
strands of literature on the audit service market utilized audit fees in their agency 
framework analysis without necessarily using it as a proxy (Musah et al., 2018; Adelopo 
et al., 2012; Khan et al., 2011; Ghosh, 2011; Yatim et al., 2006; Niemi, 2005).  
 
Research has shown that the separation of ownership from management has a 
potentially adverse effect on firm value (Nelson & Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015). It is based on 
the existence of a potential conflict of interest that necessitates corporate governance. 
Where ownership in a company is widely diffused or dispersed, significant control of the 
company resides in management. Management may use this opportunity to fulfill their 
personal interest at the expense of shareholders. The fact that shareholders vote in 
General meetings to elect directors does not guarantee them enough power as their 
individual ownership is small, giving them less control in decision making. To be able to 
monitor management in this scenario, the company will have to incur high monitoring 
costs which will include high audit fees.  
 
Previous studies have exposed that agency theory is the best theory that explains how 
ownership structure can affect agency cost, measured as audit fees in this study. 
Corporate governance is seen as one of the mechanisms used to reduce agency 
problems by increasing management monitoring, which will eventually reduce possible 
misstatement and enhance the credibility of financial reporting (Nelson & Mohamed-
Rusdi, 2015). One of the most important control mechanisms every company must have 
is a control mechanism over its financial reporting. This control system helps to provide 
reasonable assurance that the financial statement prepared are reliable. The reliability 
of the control mechanism also impacts the external auditor's work and hence audit fees. 
A lower control mechanism will result in increased audit risk and require more effort in 
terms of substantive tests and other tests to ensure the reliability of the financial 
statement (Musah et al., 2018). Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi (2015) affirm that the 
control mechanism is usually low in diffused ownership structures. It means that 
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auditors will require more time and effort, which will increase audit fees. In effect, 
diffused ownership structure will increase audit effort, thereby increasing cost. Research 
showed that high audit fees were associated with internal control deficiencies (Hogan & 
Wilkins, 2008).  
 
On the contrary, where management is concentrated or in the case of high management 
ownership, there is the possibility of strong control systems. It means to control risk will 
be lower, resulting in less effort by external auditors. It will eventually result in lower 
audit fees in consonance with less audit risk and effort. The bottom line is that different 
ownership structures will affect audit fees differently in line with agency theory and 
hence the need to examine these factors in the Ghanaian context empirically.  
 
Managerial Ownership and Audit Fees 
 
Managerial ownership in Ghana, even though low, has a significant influence on firm 
outcomes, especially firm value (Bopkin, 2011). As a result, a number of studies have 
examined various ownership structures on various form outcomes except for audit fees. 
Research on managerial ownership and audit fees by Gul, Lynn, and Tsui (2002) using 
Australian firms revealed that outside directors with a financial interest in a company by 
way of owning shares compromised their independence and hence affected their ability 
to monitor management effectively, increasing audit risk and subsequently audit fees. 
Previous studies have suggested that managerial ownership could reduce agency 
problems as there was less separation of ownership and management (Nelson & 
Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015). Moreover, management owning a share in a company is one of 
the recommended mechanisms for dealing with agency problems (Bopkin, 2011; 
Fleming, Heaney, & McCosker, 2005). It means that the more shares held by 
management, the more they are likely to work to enhance firm value as they will be 
eventual beneficiaries. In their study, Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2010) argued that in 
Common law countries like the UK and even the United States, the relationship between 
managerial ownership and audit fees is generally negative, consistent with the agency 
theory. The result means that these directors have access to private information needed 
to enhance monitoring, thereby reducing audit risk. On the other hand, Nelson and 
Mohamed-Rusdi (2015) study revealed no significant association between managerial 
ownership and audit fees. In line with agency theory, this study expects managerial 
ownership to enhance monitoring and reduce audit risk and fewer audit fees. In line 
with the above argument, the study hypothesizes that: 
 
H1: There is a negative association between managerial ownership and audit fees of 
listed firms in Ghana.  
 
 
Foreign Ownership and Audit Fees 
 
Foreign ownership is high in many African countries in terms of their ownership 
structures, and Ghana is no exception (Bokpin, 2011). It is because most of the larger 
companies in these countries are subsidiaries of multinational companies. Research has 
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shown that foreign ownership has some influence on the level of complexities in a firm 
in terms of audit, affecting audit risk and, hence, audit fees (Nelson & Mohamed-Rusdi, 
2015; Pronobis & Schaeuble, 2020). According to Niemi (2005), foreign subsidiaries, or 
foreign-owned companies, have additional financial reporting complexities because of 
their geographical separation, which will increase audit fees. The complexities are high 
in a situation where the parent company is in another country, primarily where 
accounting and reporting rules differ. Niemi (2005) argues that apart from the additional 
complexities, foreign-owned firms require greater control due to the separation of high 
ownership and management, which increases the agency conflict. Moreover, foreign 
investors are more likely to demand greater audit quality (Zureigat, 2011). Findings from 
previous studies on audit fee determinants in other jurisdictions found that foreign 
ownership increased audit fees due to additional complexities (Salleh et al. 2006; 
Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; Abdullah et al. 2008). In their study of Malaysian firms, 
Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi (2015) also found a positive and significant association 
between foreign ownership and audit fees. In line with the results of previous studies 
and agency theory, the study hypothesizes that:  
 
H2: There is a positive association between foreign ownership and audit fees of listed 
firms in Ghana. 
 
 
Government Ownership and Audit Fees  
 
According to Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi (2015), government ownership is very 
different from other ownership structures. These companies are owned and financed by 
the state through the people's taxes, which suggests that, in theory, ownership is very 
dispersed. There is also a high potential of free-riding as there is less incentive to 
monitor management behavior. On the other hand, individual acting as directors has a 
reputation to protect even though they have no cash flow rights. It may motivate them 
to improve their monitoring. However, research has shown that these shareholders bear 
no costs. It can result in weak controls, which will require quality audits to address those 
weaknesses (Nelson & Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015). This variable has received little attention 
in the literature, and as such, very little evidence is available in the empirical literature 
on how government ownership affects audit fees. Government-owned companies in 
Ghana have a high level of political interference with less control comrade to other 
companies. It makes the inclusion of this variable very important. Nelson and 
Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) study on Malaysian listed firms found a positive association 
between audit fees and government ownership. In line with the above argument, the 
study hypothesizes that:  
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Ownership Diffusion and Audit Fees 
 
Al-Okaily (2020) argued that shareholders in companies with widely dispersed 
ownership have less control and less monitoring effort; hence, they need a quality audit 
to complement their efforts. Diffused ownership also means that the need for audit 
quality is high as the dispersed owners cannot properly monitor management hence a 
good external audit is needed to make up for that deficiency (Nelson & Mohamed-Rusdi, 
2015; Hogan & Wilkins, 2008). Even though previous studies on ownership structure 
have acknowledged that diffused ownership affected audit fees, only a few of them 
actually included it in their model. For instance, Mitra et al. (2007), in their study of 
listed US firms, found a significant positive relationship between diffused ownership and 
audit fees. Diffused ownership may also increase the monitoring of shareholders’ 
behavior, thereby reducing audit risk and reducing audit fees. This study measured 
ownership diffusion using block ownership measured as having 5% or more individual 
shareholding. Based on the argument presented, the study hypothesizes that:  
 
H4: There is a negative association between block ownership and audit fees of listed 





The population for this study consisted of all listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange in 
Ghana. The total number of listed firms in Ghana stood at 37 as of August 2020. 
Therefore, the population for this study was made up of 37 listed firms in Ghana. The 
sample for this study consisted of 21 listed firms on the Ghana Stock for the period 2010 
to 2019. The sample selection was based on the availability of data and financial 
statement covering the study period. The main sample selection criteria were that the 
firms were listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange for at least ten years starting from 2010. 
Any firm listed after this period was excluded from the sample. Secondly, the full annual 
report of the company was available to allow data on all the variables, primarily 
disclosed in the notes to the account, to be collected. Finally, the sample also excluded 
financial institutions because they have regulated ownership structures, unlike non-
financial firms with no such regulations. Based on the above criteria, only 21 listed firms 
met the sample selection criteria.  
 
Empirical Model Estimation  
 
The dependent variable for this study was audit fee (AFEE). The operational definition 
for the AFEE is defined in this study as the auditor remuneration paid to the external 
auditors for the audit service rendered for the respective companies (Coffie & Bedi, 
2019; Musah et al., 2018; Barroso et al. 2016). The audit fees are measured in Ghana 
cedis and can be directly obtained from the annual reports. All Ghanaian companies 
registered under the Companies Act 2019, Act 992 are required to disclose audit fees or 
auditor remuneration in their financial statements either in the face of the financial 
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statements or in the note to the financial statements in accordance with the Companies 
Act 2019, Act 992. 
  
The independent variables in this study were managerial ownership (MOWN), foreign 
ownership (FOWN), government ownership (GOWN), and substantial (Block) ownership 
(SS). These variables can be directly obtained from the annual report that shows the 
“Analysis of Shareholding” of the company.  
 
On managerial ownership, consistent with prior studies (Mustapha & Che Ahmad, 2011; 
Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed, & Alexander, 2010), this study employed some common 
measurements of managerial ownership based on the total percentage of share held by 
the executive directors within the company and their families either direct or indirect 
shareholding. This study considered both direct and indirect shareholding by the 
executive directors and their families to get a better picture of managerial ownership.  
 






Variable Meaning Measurement 
NLAFEE Audit fees  Natural Logarithm of Audit fees  
MOWN Managerial ownership  The proportion of share held by executive 
directors and family  




Dummy, 1 if firm controlled by the 
government, and 0 otherwise  
SS Substantial (Block) 
Shareholding 
(Ownership diffusion). 
Percentage of shares held by substantial 
shareholders (3% or more) 
SIZE Firm size  Natural logarithm of total assets  
Big4 Big four audit firm  Dummy, 1 if a firm is audited by big4 audit 
firm, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
The descriptive statistics showed that the natural log of audit fees ranged from 7.6009 
to 12.611, with an average natural log of audit fees of 10.691. The main variables of 
interest were the ownership structure variables. The first ownership structure variable 
was managerial ownership (MOWN), which showed a mean of 0.1194, suggesting that 
on average, managerial ownership among listed firms in Ghana stood around 12%. This 
result is a little different from the findings of Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) study 
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on ownership structure and audit fees of Malaysian listed firms who reported a means 
of 30.5%. The results suggested a low level of managerial ownership in Ghana as 
compared to developed and emerging markets. Managerial ownership is an essential 
corporate governance mechanism as it is one of the most effective means to reduce 
agency problems and align the interest of management and shareholders. However, the 
percentage of managerial ownership was higher than the findings of Chiraz & Lesage's 
(2010) study of 12 developed and emerging countries, where the overall mean for 
managerial ownership was 9.3%. In a similar study, Aswadi Abdul Wahab et al. (2011) 
reported managerial ownership of 8.1% based on a sample of Malaysian firms from 
2001 to 2003. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
LNAudFee 210 10.691 0.967 7.6009 12.611 
MOWN 210 0.1194 0.188 0 0.606 
FOWN 210 0.35 0.478 0 1 
GOWN 210 0.2 0.401 0 1 
SS 210 0.824 0.0836 0.53 0.984 
BIG4 210 0.665 0.473 0 1 
SIZE 210 17.471 2.158 10.204 21.532 
 
The second ownership structure variable Foreign ownership (FOWN), showed a mean 
score of 35%, suggesting that 35% of the sampled firms were foreign-owned, while the 
rest were locally owned firms. The result for foreign ownership is also inconsistent with 
Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) findings, whose study reported a mean of 9.6% for 
foreign ownership. The results suggested that foreign participation of firms listed on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange was higher than in Malaysia.  
 
The third ownership variable was government ownership (GOWN), which had a mean of 
0.2 or 20%, suggesting that only 20% of firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange were 
state-controlled. The study measured this variable based on whether the company in 
question had most of its shares held by the government directly or indirectly. The result 
for this variable appears a little higher compared to the findings from Nelson and 
Mohamed-Rusdi (2015), whose study reported 14.1%, representing the percentage of 
companies listed on the Malaysian Stock exchange with significant government 
influence.  
 
The last ownership variable focused on ownership diffusion, measured by substantial 
shareholding among listed firms in Ghana. The descriptive statistic results showed that 
the average substantial shareholding among listed firms in Ghana was 82%, suggesting a 
lower ownership diffusion. The results suggested that a substantial proportion of shares 
were held by few individuals, primarily institutional investors, as opposed to small 
minority shareholders. This percentage of substantial shareholding of 82% is an increase 
compared to a previous study in Ghana, which should be a mean of 77% (Coffie & Bedi, 
2019).  
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On the control variables, the natural logarithm of firm size ranged from 10.204 to 
21.523, while that of big4 audit firms showed that almost 67% of listed firms in Ghana 
were audited by the big four audit firms. The result clearly revealed that the audit 




The correlation analysis was used to determine the relationship between the various 
independent variables and the control variables and audit fees of listed firms in Ghana. 
It was also used to determine the presence of multicollinearity. The correlation analysis 
did not show a high correlation among the independent variables, suggesting little 
evidence of multicollinearity. Pallant (2011) posits that a correlation coefficient between 
the independent variable, which is 0.8 and above, is evidence of multicollinearity. The 
correlation analysis results are presented in Table 2 below 
 
Table 2 Correlation Analysis Results 
  LNAudFee MOWN FOWN GOWN BIG4 SIZE 
LNAudFee 1.000      
MOWN -0.5357*** 1.000     
FOWN 0.5638*** -0.4458 1.000    
GOWN 0.0464 -0.3014 -0.3669 1.000   
SS 0.1095 -0.1236 0.0039 0.140 1.000  
BIG4 0.4841*** -0.4377 0.5208 -0.2278 1.000  
SIZE 0.7078*** -0.6088 0.5393 0.3873 0.3455 1.000 
Note *** means significant at 1% significance level, ** means 5% significance level, and 
* means significant at 10% significance level  
 
The results from the correlation analysis revealed a negative correlation between 
managerial ownership (MOWN) and audit fees of listed firms in Ghana. The relationship 
was also statistically significant at a 1% significance level and showed a strong negative 
correlation. The result is consistent with Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) findings, 
who also reported a correlation between managerial ownership and audit fees of 
Malaysian firms, but with a lower correlation coefficient. The results suggested that an 
increase in the percentage of share held by management reduced audit risk and audit 
complexities and improved financial reporting quality, which translated into lower audit 
fees.  
 
The correlation results also showed a strong positive correlation between foreign 
ownership (FOWN) and audit fees of listed firms in Ghana. The result was also 
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The results implied that foreign firms 
paid a higher amount as audit fees as compared to local firms. The results suggested 
that the demand for higher audit quality for foreign firms was higher, which translated 
into higher audit fees. The result is inconsistent with Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's 
(2015) findings, where they reported a weak positive and statistically insignificant 
correlation between foreign ownership and audit fees.  
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The next independent variable of interest was government ownership (GOWN) and its 
relationship with audit fees. The correlation analysis results disclosed a positive but 
statistically insignificant association between government ownership and audit fees. The 
last ownership variable, substantial shareholding (SS), used to measure ownership 
diffusion showing a positive correlation with audit fees. However, the relationship was 
statistically insignificant, and the coefficient of correlation also showed a weak 
correlation.  
 
On the control variables, the results exposed that both firm size and audit by big four 
audit firm were positively correlated with audit fees of listed firms in Ghana. The results 
suggested that international audit firms provided higher audit quality hence charged 
higher audit fees. Also, the larger firms paid higher audit fees because they required 
higher audit effort than smaller firms, translating to higher audit fees. The results are 
consistent with Musah et al. (2018), who also reported a positive association between 




To achieve the study's main objective, the panel regression analysis was conducted after 
all the tests above were carried out. The R-squared from the regression analysis of 
0.5835 implied that the independent variables could explain 58% of the variations in the 
dependent variable. The probability of the F-Statistics was also significant at a 1% 
significance level, suggesting that the model was well fit. The regression analysis results 
are displayed in table 3 below.  
 
Table 3 Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err Z 
MOWN -1.5966*** 0.5289 -3.02 
FOWN 0.8817*** 0.3226 2.74 
GOWN 0.2284 0.348 0.69 
SS 2.956*** 0.891 3.32 
BIG4 0.1362 0.1621 0.66 
SIZE 0.256*** 0.0416 6.15 
CONST 10.422 0.314 33.19 
R-Squared  0.5835   
F-Statistic 88.000   
Probability of F-Statistics 0.0000   
Note *** means significant at 1% significance level, ** means 5% significance level, and 
* means significant at 10% significance level  
 
The regression analysis results revealed a negative association between the level of 
managerial ownership and audit fees of listed firms in Ghana. The results were also 
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The results suggested that managerial 
ownership was a significant determinant of audit fees in Ghana. The result is consistent 
with the expectations of the study's first hypothesis, predicting a negative and 
significant association between managerial ownership and audit fees of listed firms in 
Ghana. The result showed that managerial ownership reduced audit risk through 
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improved monitoring and financial reporting quality, reducing audit effort and risk 
leading to lower audit fees. The result is contrary to Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's 
(2015) findings, who found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between 
managerial ownership and audit fees. The result is also inconsistent with the findings of 
Aswadi Abdul Wahab et al. (2011). The negative association between managerial 
ownership and audit fees is consistent with the agency theory expectations; thus, it 
suggests that managerial ownership reduces audit risk through improved reporting 
quality and enhances control, reducing audit fees.  
 
The second ownership variable measured foreign ownership and its effect on audit fees. 
The findings from the regression analysis disclosed a positive association between 
foreign ownership and audit fees. The result was also statistically significant at a 1% 
significance level. The results also showed that foreign ownership increased audit fees 
and, as such, was a significant determinant of audit fees in Ghana. The result is 
consistent with the second hypothesis (H2) expectation, predicting a positive and 
significant association between foreign ownership and audit fees. The results uncovered 
that foreign ownership was a significant determinant of audit fees of listed firms in 
Ghana. The results could be interpreted to mean that foreign investors demanded 
higher quality audits to compensate for the lack of direct oversight of the company’s 
operations, translating to higher audit effort and higher audit fees. The results are 
consistent with Nelson and Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) findings, who also reported a 
positive and significant association between foreign ownership and audit fees of listed 
firms in Malaysia. The result is also consistent with several other previous studies (Salleh 
et al. 2006; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006; Abdullah et al. 2008). According to Niemi 
(2005), foreign subsidiaries or foreign-owned companies have additional financial 
reporting complexities due to their geographical separation, which will increase audit 
fees. The complexities are high in a situation where the parent company is in another 
country, mainly where accounting and reporting rules differ. Niemi (2005) asserts that 
apart from the additional complexities, foreign-owned firms require greater control due 
to the separation of high ownership and management, which increases the agency 
conflict. Moreover, foreign investors are more likely to demand greater audit quality 
(Zureigat, 2011).   
 
The third ownership variable examined the effect of government ownership on audit 
fees. The regression analysis results showed a positive association between government 
ownership and audit fees. However, the result was statistically insignificant. The results 
indicated that government ownership was not a significant determinant of audit fees in 
Ghana. The study result is contrary to the expectation of the third hypothesis (H3), 
predicting a positive and significant association between government ownership and 
audit fees. The result showed that government ownership was not a significant 
determinant of audit fees in Ghana. The results are also contrary to Nelson and 
Mohamed-Rusdi's (2015) findings, which found a positive and statistically significant 
association between government ownership and audit fees. The result disclosed that 
government-controlled listed firms in Ghana had enough internal controls and good 
corporate governance systems that improved financial reporting quality and reduced 
audit fees. On the other hand, individuals acting as directors in government-controlled 
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firms have a reputation to protect even though they have no cash flow rights. It may 
have motivated them to improve their monitoring. However, research has shown that 
these shareholders bear no costs. It might explain why the results were statistically 
insignificant even though positive.  
 
The last ownership variable, substantial ownership, showed a positive association with 
audit fees of listed firms in Ghana. The result is also statistically significant at a 1% 
significance level. The result suggests that substantial ownership increases audit fees, 
and as such, ownership diffusion reduces audit fees. The result is contrary to the 
expectation of the 4th hypothesis, which predicted a negative association between 
block ownership and audit fees. The result is consistent with the findings of Mitra et al. 
(2007), who found a positive association between block ownership and audit fees of 
firms in the United States. The result suggests that block ownership does not improve 
monitoring and quality of financial statement preparation but rather increases audit 
complexities or audit risk, which increases audit fees.  
 
On the control variable, the study result showed that firm size was positively associated 
with audit fees. The relationship was also statistically significant at a 1% significance 
level. The result is consistent with several studies’ findings across the globe. Previous 
studies have revealed that company size affected audit plans (Castro et al., 2015; Kikhia, 
2014; Musah et al. 2018; Coffie & Bedi, 2019). Large companies require more attention 
than smaller companies; therefore, more time will be spent on audit work, and as a 
result, high audit fees will be charged to more prominent companies as opposed to 
smaller ones (Xu, 2011; Simon & Taylor, 2002). Large size companies would be involved 
in more activities than small ones. They are usually more publicly visible, and they tend 
to disclose more information than small companies. The use of big4 audit firms was not 
a significant determinant of audit fees even though it showed a positive coefficient with 
audit fees. This result is inconsistent with previous studies on audit fees in Ghana (Yalley 
et al., 2013; Musah, 2017; Musah et al. 2018, Coffie & Bedi, 2019). The result showed no 
significant difference between audit fees charged by local audit firms compared to those 





The study examined the effect of the ownership structure of listed firms in Ghana on 
audit fees. The study found a negative and significant association between managerial 
ownership and audit fees in Ghana. The result also showed a positive and significant 
association between foreign ownership and audit fees in Ghana. The study further 
uncovered a positive and significant relationship between block ownership and audit 
fees. The results, however, found an insignificant association between government 
ownership and audit fees. The results indicated that ownership structure had a 
significant influence on audit fees in Ghana. The study took inspiration from the agency 
theory to explain the relationship between ownership structures and fees paid to 
external auditors. It could be deduced from the study result that the higher the agency 
conflict, the higher the audit fees to be paid to external auditors as it will increase audit 
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risk. This study’s findings may also have some implications for the regulators by 
providing a clear picture concerning the effect ownership structure that might have to 
standardize the internal control among the companies. The result suggested that there 
was a positive relationship between agency conflict and audit fees. The findings of a 
negative association between managerial ownership and audit fees, as well as the 
positive association between foreign ownership and audit fees, are consistent with 
agency theory. The result showed that different ownership structures resulted in 
different forms of control, showing the difference in agency problems. Nevertheless, the 
study was limited to listed firms in Ghana, excluding financial firms, providing an 
opportunity for future studies to examine the influence of ownership structures on audit 
fees of financial institutions in Ghana. Also, the future study can conduct a cross-country 
study using a number of countries in Africa since this study was limited to Ghana, and 
there is currently limited literature on the subject matter in the African context. Another 
limitation that can be addressed in future studies is the fact that the study did not 
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